Sale of Defective Houses: Cicero and the Moral Choice by Orth, John V.
University of North Carolina School of Law
Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2003
Sale of Defective Houses: Cicero and the Moral
Choice
John V. Orth
University of North Carolina School of Law, jvorth@email.unc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons
Publication: Green Bag 2d
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
163
Sale of Defective Houses
Cicero  the Moral Choice
John V. Orth
uppose that an honest man wants to
sell a house because of certain defects of
which he alone is aware. The building is
supposed to be quite healthy, but is in fact
insanitary, and he is aware that it is; or the
place is badly built and is falling down, but
nobody knows this except the owner. Suppose
he does not disclose these facts to purchasers,
and sells the house for much more than he
expected. Has he behaved unfairly and
dishonestly?” – Marcus Tullius Cicero
Sound familiar? Questions like this are
posed every year in the basic property course.
After a discussion more or less Socratic, the
usual picture that emerges is of an old rule in
favor of sellers increasingly riddled with excep-
tions favoring buyers. The logical starting
point turns out to be a common-law position
against implied warranties of quality in the sale
of real estate, so in the absence of express
warranties prospective purchasers take the
property as-is. The rationale is said to be that
since they are able to inspect the premises prior
to purchase, “their eyes are their bargain.”1 The
eÖect of the rule is captured by the Latin
phrase: Caveat emptor! Let the buyer beware!2
As disclosed in the usual course of discus-
sion, the attack on the common-law position
did not begin with a frontal assault. Instead,
using a common maneuver, the critics turned
the rationale into a means to conÕne the rule. If
their eyes were truly their bargain, then
purchasers who were unable to see the property
were not bound if it turned out to be unÕt. Pur-
chasers operating at a distance were necessarily
forced to rely on representations, implied if not
express, concerning quality,3 while a purchaser
of an unÕnished structure had only the
1 See John E. Cribbet et al., Cases and Materials on Property 1230 (5th ed. 1996).
2 See Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims 768 (8th ed. 1882). See generally Walter H.
Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim of Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L.J. 1133 (1931).
3 Cf. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 31 N.E. 286 (Mass. 1892) (short term lease of furnished house at Swampscott);
Smith v. Marrable, 11 M.  W. 5, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Exch. 1843) (short term lease of furnished house
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Hill. This article is the third in his series of reappraisals of the law of property.
“S
v6n2.book  Page 163  Monday, December 16, 2002  11:13 PM
John V. Orth
164 6 G r e e n  B a g  2 d  1 6 3
builder’s plans to examine.4 Even in cases in
which the premises were available for inspec-
tion, purchasers were bound to take only what
they could see: latent or hidden defects were
the vendors’ responsibility.5
Eventually the attack centered on the rule
itself. If manufacturers of consumer products
were bound by an implied warranty of Õtness,
then home-builders should be comparably
bound. The purchasers’ opportunity to inspect
was no longer central; the complexity of the
product made brief inspection, particularly by
unskilled home-buyers, largely irrelevant.6 At
last, purchasers of a completed house were
allowed to recover against the builder-vendor
because of an implied warranty of quality.7
Thereafter attention shifted to consolidat-
ing the new rule. Remaining questions
concerned whether subsequent purchasers
could also sue the builder: Was privity
required?8 Whether purchasers could bargain
away the protection provided by the implied
warranty: Was waiver possible?9 And when did
the statute of limitations begin to run: Did the
cause of action accrue when construction was
complete or when the defect Õrst became
apparent?10
The next stage is to determine what remains
of the old rule of caveat emptor. It still holds
apparently with respect to commercial, as
opposed to residential, property.11 The ratio-
nale that purchasers could protect themselves
4 Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., 2 K.B. 113 (Eng. 1931) (purchase of unÕnished structure);
Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 140 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio App. 1957) (purchase of unÕnished structure) (on
completion and occupancy, inadequate sewer system rendered house insanitary and unhealthy).
5 Barnes v. MacBrown  Co., 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1976) (latent defect in pre-owned house).
6 In a sense, this was a development of the rule concerning latent defects: even under a strict rule of
caveat emptor, the purchaser was not held to have accepted defects that could not reasonably have
been discovered by inspection. Of course, the purchaser could have been charged with the
knowledge of what a skilled inspector would have discovered, just as the purchaser is charged with
the knowledge concerning title that a professional title-searcher would have discovered. See text at
note 12, infra.
7 Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., Inc., 389 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. 1979); Hartley v. Ballou, 209 S.E.2d
776 (N.C. 1974); Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So.2d 313 (Ala. 1971).
at Brighton). Because the common law regarded leases as conveyances, as explained below, text at
note 28, infra, cases concerning claims of defective premises, whether leased or sold outright, are
cited interchangeably in this article.
8 Barnes v. MacBrown  Co., 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1976) (privity not required); Keyes v. Guy Bailey
Homes, Inc., 439 So.2d 670 (Miss. 1983) (same); Terlinde v. Neely, 271 S.E.2d 768 (S.C. 1980)
(same); Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v. Frantz, 885 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1994) (same). See D. Brent
Marshall, Note, Relief to Subsequent Home Purchasers in Kentucky: The Past, Present, Future, and Frantz,
85 Ky. L.J. 483 (1996-97). See generally Sean M. O’Brien, Caveat Venditor: A Case for Granting
Subsequent Purchasers a Cause of Action Against Builder-Vendors for Latent Defects in the Home, 1995 J.
Corp. Law 525.
9 Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., Inc., 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (Ill. 1979) (“a knowing disclaimer of
the implied warranty” is not contrary to public policy); Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879
(Mo. 1977) (more than a “boilerplate” disclaimer is required). See generally Powell, Disclaimers of
Implied Warranties in the Sale of New Homes, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 1123 (1989).
10 Statutes of repose have in some instances determined the question by limiting actions to some gross
period beginning with the completion of construction. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(a)
(limiting cause of action to recover damages for defective improvement to real property to six years
after “substantial completion of the improvement”); Nolan v. Paramount Homes, Inc., 518 S.E.2d
789 (N.C. App. 1999) (construing the statute).
11 C.F.R. Foods, Inc. v. Randolph Development, 421 S.E.2d 386, 389 (N.C. App. 1992) (sale of land for
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through prior inspection still seemingly makes
sense when businesspeople are involved on
both sides of the transaction, special needs
might be involved, and the public interest in
housing is lacking. The old rule certainly
remains with respect to titles, as opposed to
physical defects. Concerning the state of the
title, there still are no implied covenants, so
express warranties of title continue to appear in
almost every deed. Here “their eyes are their
bargain” remains valid since the registry of
deeds opened the chain of title to inspection.12
The only remaining question concerns
whether covenants contained in a prior con-
tract of sale survived delivery of the deed or
were terminated by merger.13
Near the end of the usual classroom
discussion come questions like those posed at
the beginning of this article. The peculiar
feature in these cases is that they involve the
seller of “used” housing, not the original
builder. The speciÕc technical issue may now
be fraudulent concealment of relevant facts
rather than an implied covenant of Õtness as
such, but the general problem remains the
same. Since the physical defects are known
only to the seller, the buyer may not have
assumed the risk. The question may be
harder with respect to some “insanitary” con-
ditions, perhaps best exempliÕed today by a
stigmatizing feature such as a death on the
premises by homicide, suicide, or AIDS.14
These may in fact not be objective reasons to
Õnd fault with the property, but prospective
12 Actually, as every title-searcher knows, examination of the record cannot disclose all possible defects
of title. Forged or undelivered deeds, undisclosed spouses, and mistakes in indexing are only the
most obvious sources of problems. Since buyers risk the loss of their investment, a special branch of
the insurance industry has developed to oÖer policies of title insurance.
13 The doctrine of merger has been described as “an old but misleading concept.” John E. Cribbet et
al., Cases and Materials on Property 1240 (5th ed. 1996):
BrieÔy stated, it means that any covenants in the contract merge into the deed on the execu-
tion of the deed and are no longer enforceable. Actually, the contract covenants are terminated
rather than merged and the parties must then look to the deed for any cause of action. It is ba-
sically a titles doctrine designed to prevent the grantee from going behind the deed to earlier
promises. There are many exceptions to the doctrine when title is not directly involved and
when the covenant is collateral to the promise to convey land.
See Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975) (merger not applied); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf,
441 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1982) (same).
development as shopping center) (citations omitted):
Where “the purchaser has full opportunity to make pertinent inquiries but fails to do so
through no artiÕce or inducement of the seller, an action in fraud will not lie.” Here, plaintiÖ
had a full opportunity to make pertinent inquiries and failed to do so through no inducement
of the seller. By the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to its purchase, plaintiÖ could have
discovered the problem and protected its interests accordingly.
14 The depressing eÖect on the rental market of bad news connected with the premises is concisely
illustrated in a short story by O. Henry, “The Furnished Room,” quoting an Irish-American landlady
in New York: “There be many people will rayjict the rentin’ of a room if they be tould a suicide has
been after dyin’ in the bed of it.”
See Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. App. 1983) (failure to disclose that premises were the
site ten years earlier of a multiple murder); Van Camp v. Bradford, 623 N.E.2d 731 (Ohio Com. Pl.
1993) (failure to disclose recent rape on premises). See generally Sharlene A. McEvoy, Stigmatized Prop-
erty: What a Buyer Should Know, 48 J. Mo. Bar 57 (1992).
Legislation in many states regulates the disclosure of stigmatizing features. See, e.g., Cal. Civ.
Code § 1710.2(a) (no cause of action for failure to disclose AIDS-related death on premises more
than three years previously); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-50 (death or illness of previous occupant not a
material fact, but seller may not knowingly make a false statement regarding such past occupant).
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buyers may, for reasons of their own,
consider them relevant.
The course of legal development, the
“progress of the law,” as revealed by this discus-
sion appears to be almost entirely driven by
logic. The rule against implied warranties of
quality in the sale of real property is posited, its
rationale deduced; hypothetical cases are
posed, designed to test whether the rule really
furthers the reason in speciÕc instances. The
old regime of caveat emptor swiftly crumbles; the
only real question is whether any fragments of
it survive. Considered as a matter of logic, the
solution can be arrived at quickly, in no more
than one or two class hours. After such a
discussion no student is particularly surprised
to learn that in only a few years the common-
law position against implied warranties has
been replaced by the routine implication of
warranties of habitability in a majority of
states.15
Before exploring further the reason for this
sudden shift in legal rules, it may be helpful to
return to the questions posed at the beginning
of this article and to see them as they were
originally phrased more than two thousand
years ago:
Vendat aedes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia,
quae ipse norit, ceteri ignorent, pestilentes sint
et habeantur salubres, ignoretur in omnibus
cubiculis apparere serpentes, male materiatae
sint, ruinosae, sed hoc praeter dominum nemo
sciat; quaero, si haec emptoribus venditor non
dixerit aedesque vendiderit pluris multo, quam
si venditurum putarit, num id iniuste aut
improbe fecerit.16
The questioner was Marcus Tullius Cicero
(106-43 B.C.), Roman statesman and lawyer.
The discussion, set out in Cicero’s De OÓciis
(On Duties) in 44 B.C., is remarkably like
classroom dialogues today. Indeed, in strict
accordance with Socratic precedent, Cicero
records a dialogue between two Greek-named
interlocutors. Antipater17 argues that it is
unfair and dishonest for a seller intentionally to
mislead a buyer, drawing an analogy to the case
of a person who refuses to help someone who is
lost.18 Diogenes19 in reply denies that the seller
is duty-bound to disclose defects: people
expect a seller to overpraise the product.
Restating the maxim “their eyes are their bar-
gain,” Diogenes asks: “[W]hen the purchaser
can exercise his own judgement, what fraud can
there be on the part of the seller?”20 Cicero
himself views the problem as one of moral
choice and in the end sides with the proponent
of full disclosure, concluding “the man who was
15 Sean M. O’Brien, Caveat Venditor: A Case for Granting Subsequent Purchasers a Cause of Action Against
Builder-Vendors for Latent Defects in the Home, 1995 J. Corp. Law 525, 530 (“Although the theory of
implied warranty of habitability, in a span of thirty years, became the rule in a majority of states,
courts limited its application to the original purchaser of a new home from a builder-vendor.”).
16 Cicero, De Officiis 3:13:54 (Loeb ed. 1913). The translation used at the beginning of this article is
by Michael Grant. Cicero, Selected Works 179 (trans. Michael Grant 1960).
17 Antipater of Tarsus (2nd century B.C.), a Stoic philosopher, was the pupil of Diogenes of Babylonia,
with whom the supposed dialogue is conducted.
18 The analogy is unpersuasive in the common law tradition in which there is in general no legal duty
to render assistance to others.
19 Diogenes of Babylonia, also known as Diogenes of Seleucia, a Stoic philosopher, was the pupil of
Chrysippus and the teacher of Antipater of Tarsus. He was part of a delegation of philosophers who
visited Rome in 156 B.C. as ambassadors of Athens, seeking remission of a Õne. While on their
diplomatic mission, the philosophers gave public lectures, which were so well attended by young
Romans that Cato the Elder persuaded the Senate to expel all philosophers from the city for fear they
were diverting the young men from their military exercises. See Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble
Grecians and Romans 428 ( John Dryden  Arthur Hugh Clough trans. 1864) (Modern Lib. ed.)
(life of Marcus Cato).
20 Cicero, Selected Works 179 (trans. Michael Grant 1960).
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selling the house should not have withheld its
defects from the purchaser.”21
The point of rehearsing this ancient history
is to demonstrate that the concerns still actively
discussed today are as old as the hills of Rome.
Indeed, they are older: Cicero relied on Greek
sources. Which means that these arguments, at
least standing alone, cannot possibly be what
caused modern American law concerning the
sale of defective houses to begin changing fairly
suddenly only a few decades ago. Logic did not
cause the change; the logical arguments have
been well understood not just for centuries but
for millennia.22
But if logic did not drive the change, what
did? Aside from the logical arguments, the
cases and commentators routinely allude to
changes in the real estate market to explain the
shifting legal rules. As one court put it in 1979:
Because of the vast change that has taken place
in the method of constructing and marketing
new houses, we feel that it is appropriate to
hold that in the sale of a new house by a
builder-vendor, there is an implied warranty of
habitability which will support an action
against the builder-vendor by the vendee for
latent defects and which will avoid the unjust
results of caveat emptor and the doctrine of
merger.23
Typical is the assertion that before 1945 the
mass production of houses was unknown.24
Statistics certainly show a post-World War II
building boom, as productive capacity was
redirected from the war eÖort to the task of
making up for lost time and housing the newly
demobilized military forces.25 Something sim-
ilar had, however, occurred before. Indeed, the
birth of the suburbs is usually dated a genera-
tion earlier, in the period after World War I:
In the 1920s the American population as a
whole increased by 16%. Those living in the
centers of cities increased by 22%. But those
living in the satellite areas – the suburbs –
increased by 44%. … What does all this add
up to? The United States took to wheels. This
was quite truly the age of the mass automobile.
With the automobile the United States began
21 Id. 180. Cicero did not limit his conclusion to cases of the sale of defective houses but extended it to
sales of personal property as well, including sales of slaves. “[I]f a man knows that a slave he is selling
is unhealthy, or a runaway, or a thief, he must (unless the slave is one he has inherited) report
accordingly.” Id. 185-86. Similar problems must have arisen in some American states prior to the
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.
22 Cicero’s De OÓciis was “used as their prime textbook by generations of university students in
England and France and Germany.” Moses Hadas, A History of Latin Literature 135 (1952).
Studying Cicero was once also a prominent part of the education of American elites, particularly
lawyers. See Stephen Botein, Cicero as Role Model for Early American Lawyers: A Case Study in Classical
“InÔuence,” 73 Classical J. 313 (1978).
23 Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., Inc., 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1157-58 (Ill. 1979). Introduction of the
phrase “latent defects” in the holding raises a question about how new the rule really is: purchasers
even under a strict regime of caveat emptor may not have been held to accept defective property when
the defect was latent and not discoverable by inspection. See text at note 5, supra.
24 Leo Bearman, Jr., Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty – Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 541,
542 (1961) (“A changing law for sales of personalty, stimulated perhaps by early mass production and
accompanying mass buying and consequent mass expectation of quality, had little eÖect upon the
rules governing sales of realty, since before 1945 no similar mass production methods had so totally
invaded the building industry.”).
25 Id. 542 n.6:
Statistics reveal that the value of annual new construction of private residential buildings rose
from less than $2,000,000,000 annually in 1945 to about $15,000,000,000 annually in 1950
and about $18,000,000,000 annually by September 1959. At the same time, the number of
one-family non-farm dwelling units begun in each year rose from about 100,000 units begun
in 1945 to about 1,150,000 units begun in 1950.
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a vast inner migration into newly constructed,
single-family houses in the suburbs; and these
new houses were Õlled increasingly with
radios, refrigerators, and the other household
gadgetry of a society whose social mobility and
productivity had all but wiped out personal
service. Within these houses Americans
shifted their food consumption to higher-
grade foods, increasingly purchased in cans –
or, later, frozen.26
Development of a new suburban housing
pattern, no matter when exactly it emerged,
seems hardly adequate as a complete explana-
tion of the appearance of the modern implied
covenant of Õtness in the sale of residential real
estate because the new legal rule concerning
houses was closely linked with a simultaneous
development in urban real estate law. In the law
of landlord and tenant, predominantly a
concern of city-dwellers, an implied covenant
of habitability in residential leases was
recognized.27 Leases had traditionally been
viewed as a form of conveyance28 with,
perhaps, a few promises known as “covenants”
attached. As a conveyance, the lease fell under
the common-law rule against implied warran-
ties, so unless an express covenant of Õtness was
included in the lease, none was implied.29
Then, again fairly suddenly, an implied cove-
nant or warranty of habitability was recognized
in residential leases.30
In the law both of leasing and selling resi-
dential real property the shift toward implied
covenants was associated with a renewed
emphasis on the contractual aspect of the
transaction.31 So long as leasing and selling real
estate were viewed primarily as conveyancing,
26 Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth 77 (2d ed. 1971).
27 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1076 (D.C. Cir.) (Õnding an implied
covenant of habitability in residential leases and noting that “courts have begun to hold sellers and
developers of real property responsible for the quality of their product”), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., Inc., 389 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. 1979) (Õnding an implied
warranty of Õtness in a contract for the sale of a house and noting that same court had already
recognized an implied warranty of habitability in a residential lease).
28 The principal forms of conveyance at common law were: feoÖment, lease, grant, and mortgage. 3
American Law of Property 215 (A. James Casner ed. 1952). 
29 As of 1952, the standard treatise on American property law stated the then universal rule:
There is no implied covenant or warranty that at the time the term commences the premises are
in a tenantable condition or that they are adapted to the purpose for which leased. The tenant,
then, cannot use such unÕtness either as a defense to an action for rent or as a basis for recovery
in tort for damages to person or property. The reason assigned for this rule is that the tenant
is a purchaser of an estate in land, subject to the doctrine of caveat emptor. He may inspect the
premises and determine for himself their suitability or he may secure an express warranty.
1 American Law of Property 267 (A. James Casner ed. 1952).
30 The law of landlord and tenant is today increasingly divided into residential and commercial
components. This, in turn, has placed a hitherto unknown emphasis on the deÕnition of “residential
tenant.” See, e.g., Brigdon v. Lamb, 929 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1997) (distinguishing “possession prior to
sale” from tenancy). See also John V. Orth, Who Is a Tenant? The Correct DeÕnition of the Status in North
Carolina, 21 N.C. Cent. L.J. 79, 81 (1995); John V. Orth, Confusion Worse Confounded: The North
Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 783 (2000).
31 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.) (“leases of urban dwelling
units should be interpreted and construed like any other contract”), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970);
Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 837 (D.C. Cir.) (Õnding no reason “to treat a lease
agreement diÖerently from any other contract”), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969); Wright v. Baumann,
398 P.2d 119 (Or. 1965) (construing lease as essentially a contract rather than a conveyance). See
generally John V. Orth, “Contract and the Common Law,” in The State and Freedom of Contract
44-65 (ed. Harry N. Scheiber, 1999) (describing the substitution of contract for property as the
organizing principle of the common law).
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that is, transferring an interest in real property,
the legal emphasis remained on the eÖective-
ness of the transfer as such, rather than on the
characteristics of the property transferred. The
common law presumed that title
was of paramount concern to the
transferee and restricted the legal
inquiry to whether and when title
passed and to the quality of title
involved. Once the transactions
were reconceptualized in terms of
contract, the seller’s performance
could be seen as essentially the per-
formance of a set of promises,
rather than as simply the delivery
of title. The property itself, as
opposed to the title to it, emerged as a focus of
legal interest.
Although the changes in the law of leasing
and selling residential real property advanced
in tandem, diÖerences in the legal structure of
the two transactions produced diÖerent
doctrinal emphases. The lease was increasingly
assimilated to a contract, while in sales the
emphasis shifted from the deed that conveyed
title to the preceding contract for the sale of
land, that promised to transfer the property.
Leases and deeds were now treated as
conceptually distinct. In the law of landlord
and tenant the covenant of habitability was
simply implied in the lease; in the law of
conveyancing, on the other hand, it was usually
implied in the contract of sale.32 Emphasis on
the contract of sale in conveyancing may be
attributed to the continuing strength of the
rule against implied covenants in deeds,33 as
well as to the greater Ôexibility of contract
doctrine. Whatever its cause, the new
emphasis led in turn to pressure in the law of
deeds to relax the old doctrine of merger in
order to preserve elements of the contract after
the eÖectiveness of the conveyance.
Again, logical arguments in
favor of changing the law of land-
lord and tenant are routinely
supplemented with a recital of
facts concerning developments in
the rental housing market; this
time the emphasis is on the
circumstances of urban dwellers
rather than suburbanites. In 1970,
in Javins v. First National Realty
Corp., the landmark case concern-
ing the implied warranty of habitability in
leases, Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote on behalf
of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia:
The assumption of landlord-tenant law,
derived from feudal property law, that a lease
primarily conveyed to the tenant an interest in
land may have been reasonable in a rural,
agrarian society; it may continue to be
reasonable in some leases involving farming or
commercial land. In these cases, the value of
the lease to the tenant is the land itself. But in
the case of the modern apartment dweller, the
value of the lease is that it gives him a place to
live. … When American city dwellers, both
rich and poor, seek “shelter” today, they seek a
well known package of goods and services – a
package which includes not merely walls and
ceilings, but also adequate heat, light, and
ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities,
secure windows and doors, proper sanitation,
and proper maintenance.34
While this catalogue of wants of modern
32 In some cases Õnding an implied covenant of habitability in sales of real estate, it is unclear exactly
where the covenant is implied, whether in the contract for sale or in the deed.
33 The rule against implied covenants in deeds is related to the use of covenants for title: where express
covenants are involved, and presumably bargained for, it is reasonable to exclude implied covenants.
See text at note 12, supra. It would, of course, also be possible to limit the rule against implied
covenants in deeds to implied covenants concerning title, the subject of the express covenants.
34 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970). 
Marcus Tullius Cicero
(106 B.C. - 43 B.C.)
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urban apartment dwellers may be readily
accepted as accurate, it is hardly the case that
these wants arose for the Õrst time in the last
half of the twentieth century. Apartment-
dwelling has been a perennial feature of urban
life. Nor is it plausible to attribute the mod-
ern revaluation of tenants’ rights to the
decline of the agrarian tenant or the demise of
feudalism – both of which preceded the doc-
trinal development by years, if not by
centuries.35
Emphasis on the contractual aspect of the
lease made it fairly easy to draw an analogy to
concurrent developments in the general law of
contracts. The ubiquitous Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC) popularized in the law of
sales of personal property a general warranty
of merchantability or Õtness for a particular
purpose.36 Consumer products such as the
automobile and assorted household gadgets
now came with implied warranties of quality.
Courts inclined to extend the rights of pur-
chasers and lessees of residential real property
routinely cited the related concepts of the
UCC.37 As one commentator sharply
expressed it in 1965, “As far as assurances of
quality are concerned, our law oÖers greater
protection to the purchaser of a seventy-nine
cent dog leash than it does to the purchaser of
a 40,000-dollar house.”38 The point became
even more telling as the prices of dog leashes
but, especially, of houses escalated.39
Seemingly minor terminological problems
incident to importing concepts from the law
35 If American property law did indeed maintain a legal rule suitable to feudalism, the question
remains why the rule so long outlived its historical context. See John V. Orth, Thinking About Law
Historically: Why Bother?, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 287, 293 (1991) (suggesting that the provision in the 1960s
of federally funded legal services for the poor was a major factor motivating the change).
36 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade:
(1) Unless excluded or modiÕed (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2)Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a)pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b)in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are Õt for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d)run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e)are adequately contained, packaged and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f )conform to the promise or aÓrmation of fact made on the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modiÕed (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise from
course of dealing or usage of trade.
§ 2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modiÕed under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be Õt for such purpose.
37 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., Inc., 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill. 1979). See also Comment,
Washington’s New Home Implied Warranty of Habitability – Explanation and Model Statute, 54 Wash. L.
Rev. 185 (1978).
38 Paul G. Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 Geo. L.J. 633,
633 (1965).
39 It could, of course, be argued that the purchaser of the more expensive item should be held to a
higher standard of care before purchase.
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of sales of personal property reveal the
imperfect “join” of modern contract law and
traditional real property law. While the UCC
speaks in terms of merchantability, the word
has not caught on in describing the new
implied warranty in the sale and lease of
residential real property. The common law
has long recognized an implied “warranty of
merchantability” in contracts for the sale of
land, but it is the state of the title that is
impliedly warranted to be merchantable, not
the condition of the premises.40 Hence the
search for a more descriptive term.
“Warranty of habitability” is often used, but
“habitability” does not adequately describe
the scope of the new warranty. As one court
has phrased it in a case involving the sale of
residential real property, “[t]he mere fact that
the house is capable of being inhabited does
not satisfy the implied warranty.”41
Construing the warranty of habitability in
leases, another court has read it expansively
to include, in addition to the physical condi-
tion of the premises, “reasonable safeguards
to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal
activity.”42 An implied warranty of Õtness or
quality seems, therefore, a more descriptive
label.43
Invocation of the UCC and the law of sales
of personal property suggests that the principal
driving force in changing the law of sales and
leases of residential real property has not been
either newly discovered Ôaws in real property
doctrine or recent changes in the real estate
market. Such local causes are inadequate to
explain a global change. What developments in
the law of sales of personal property, residential
leases, and conveyancing of residential real
estate have in common is, to put it bluntly, a
preference for purchasers – whether of chattels,
residential leaseholds, or fee interests in
residential real estate – over sellers of consumer
products, landlords, and builders. The prefer-
ence for purchasers began with purchasers of
consumer goods, particularly automobiles,44
but then spread fairly rapidly to tenants and
home-buyers. The underlying premise seems
to be that purchasers need legal protection
against sellers.
Ambient factors that eased the change in
policy in these areas of the law include a gener-
alized preference for plaintiÖs: buyers are
more likely to sue than sellers, and plaintiÖs
are more likely to win today. Increased social
tolerance for litigation may also have played a
role: the old rule of caveat emptor, rigorously
applied, served to reduce the number of
lawsuits. Increased judicial activism obviously
contributed to the development: unless the
pull of precedent was reduced, such wholesale
legal change by judicial decision would have
been impossible.
Concern for eÓciency may also have
inÔuenced the change of policy. Assuming
purchasers knew and understood the rule of
caveat emptor, it may have retarded transactions,
40 See Wallach v. Riverside Bank, 100 N.E. 50 (N.Y. 1912) (holding that an executory contract for the
sale of land includes an implied covenant that vendor must deliver a merchantable title at the
closing). See also Uniform Land Transfer Act § 2-304(d) (adopting “the rule of Wallach”).
41 Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., Inc., 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill. 1979).
42 Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980). See also Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.) (referring to habitable premises as having “secure windows and doors,” which
may imply more than apertures that are wind and waterproof ), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
43 The implied warranty of Õtness does seem to be limited to the lease and sale of residential property
and therefore is an implied warranty of Õtness for residential use; it has not been extended to leases
and sales of real estate generally; that is, it has not become a general warranty of Õtness for any
known intended use, including commercial uses.
44 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (eliminating requirement of
privity and permitting ultimate consumer to sue manufacturer).
v6n2.book  Page 171  Monday, December 16, 2002  11:13 PM
John V. Orth
172 6 G r e e n  B a g  2 d  1 6 3
particularly in the consumer product market.45
Whether because of concern that the legal
message concerning the peril of not inspecting
products before purchase did not get through
or because of the increased transaction costs
imposed by the rule if it did, law makers may
have chosen to shift the risk from buyers to
sellers. In practical terms, legal allocation of the
risk of loss means, in cases involving knowl-
edgeable parties, the assignment of the cost of
inspection and the implementation of some
method of spreading the cost of failure, such as
through pricing or insurance.46
Here again, doctrine did not lead the
change, but followed it. The role of doctrine
was to implement a policy choice not to dictate
one.47 But the new policy preference in favor of
purchasers inspired further doctrinal develop-
ment. The age-old common law distinction
between real and personal property, already
weakened, was eroded further as sales and
leases of residential real property were assimi-
lated to purchases of personal property.48
Leases, once a form of conveyance, became a
contract “like any other,” and the contract for
the sale of land gained a new signiÕcance. The
implication of a warranty of habitability in
leases meant expanded scope for the doctrine
of constructive eviction,49 and quickly trans-
lated into increased tort liability for land-
lords.50 Expanding tort liability for sellers of
residential real estate seems likely.
The recognition of an implied warranty of
habitability in leases and sales of residential
real estate raised serious questions about
whether an implied warranty of Õtness should
be recognized in the lease and sale of commer-
cial real estate as well. The appeal of the argu-
ment was more logical than practical because
of the diversity of commercial uses, and the
urge has been resisted despite the fact that the
UCC protects merchant as well as non-
merchant buyers. In this case the diÖerences
between real and personal property seem to
remain salient.
It is noteworthy that Cicero, long ago,
45 A rule encouraging inspection prior to purchase is less likely to retard real estate transactions,
whether sale or lease, because delay and some sort of inspection are already standard procedure. 
46 Despite the demise of caveat emptor in sales of residential real estate, purchasers routinely seek
professional inspections, as evidenced by the thriving business of private building inspectors. The
only question is whether the buyer or the seller should bear the cost of inspection and the risk of
mistake. 
47 Doctrine’s principal purpose in the decision of individual cases is to direct the attention of the judge
away from the particularities of the parties and the speciÕcs of the given dispute. Its broader social
purpose is to secure the Õrst rule of justice, that like cases be decided alike.
48 The common law routinely distinguished real property (loosely deÕned as land and everything
growing out of it or aÓxed to it) from personal property (everything else). Many diÖerent rules
applied to the two species of property, particularly in case of inheritance. In many states and in
England succession to land and to personalty have today been completely assimilated. John E.
Cribbet et al., Cases and Materials on Property 221 (5th ed. 1996). But see N.C. Gen. Stat. §
29-14 (distinguishing real from personal property in calculation of the share of a surviving spouse). 
49 See Robert S. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant § 3:6, pp.103-04 (1980)
(“the interrelationship between the doctrine of constructive eviction and the recently fashioned
implied covenant of habitability is clear: where recognized, the implied warranty allows the tenant,
in addition to whatever other remedies may Ôow from recognition of the covenant, to abandon the
premises and be absolved of all responsibility for future rental payments”).
50 See Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973) (adoption of an implied warranty of habitability
destroys “the very legal foundation and justiÕcation for the landlord’s immunity in tort for injuries to
the tenant or third persons”); Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 443 (N.J. 1980) (“By failing to
provide adequate security, the landlord has … breached his implied warranty of habitability and is
liable to the tenant for the injuries attributable to that breach.”).
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seemed to think that he could discuss the
issue of the sale of defective houses without
reference to market conditions in the Roman
Empire. This was the case, of course, because
he viewed the issue as one primarily of moral
choice, in the sense of rule-making that
reÔected and created good mores or custom-
ary patterns of behavior. Moral discourse is
today discouraged in legal decision-making in
favor of utilitarian arguments, but moral
choices continue to be made. It may in fact be
far more explanatory to begin a discussion of
the changing law concerning the sale of defec-
tive houses by focusing on the moral choice
between favoring consumers, on the one hand,
and producers, on the other, without regard to
the particular product consumed.
Legal discourse that emphasizes objective,
external factors that inÔuence the development
of legal rules seems designed to conceal the
extent to which legal development is the
product of conscious choice. Emphasis on
changing market conditions, such as the
increasing prevalence of mass produced goods,
whether consumer products, urban apart-
ments, or suburban houses, suggests a sort of
economic determinism: the implication is that
legal rules respond, sometimes belatedly, to
market forces. Equally deterministic, if less
obviously so, is emphasis on the need for legal
rules to conform to patterns of behavior, for
example, the supposed fact that consumers do
not or cannot protect themselves by inspection
prior to purchase. That legal rules follow
public opinion or practice also implies that
external factors drive judicial choice.
A more sophisticated version of this sort of
non-economic determinism is the argument
that the need for consistency with other legal
developments constrains legal choice, for
example, the argument that the same rule
must apply to all consumer purchases,
whether of chattels or real estate (except as to
the state of the title). That modern American
judges should seek to emphasize factors that
seem to reduce their policy-making role is
perhaps partly to be explained by consider-
ations of separation of powers. Judges, after
all, are not explicitly vested with legislative
power. Cicero obviously had no experience
with modern constitutional democracy, so was
unembarrassed about his rule-making.
Emphasis on the moral choice in legal
development does not, however, necessarily
equate the judicial and legislative roles.
While not a denial of practical factors,
neither is it a simple abdication to the market
or popular practice. It can be, instead, a
principled attempt to formulate a workable
rule that will shape the market and lead
popular practice. Good social customs exist
in a reciprocal relation with good legal rules:
custom reÔects popular understanding, but it
also responds to legal rules, at least to known
legal rules that embody enlightened moral
choices. B
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